



Wednesday **November 13, 2019** at 14:30

Politecnico di Torino, DISMA, Aula Seminari (third floor)

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Social learning with Bayesian and non-Bayesian agents

Prof. Giacomo Como introduces the seminar.

Abstract

We consider a model of opinion dynamics and successful learning. Individuals exchange their opinions about some topic. Moreover, each individual receives external private information. In order to take into account the opinions of friends, they update their beliefs in a mixed way: Bayesian way (as rational players) for private signals, and via DeGroot model (as naive players). We find that the society converges to the consensus – the true state. In contrast with efficient information aggregation, there is no consensus in the presence of a stubborn player. We also study the convergence time, i.e., the time needed for the society to reveal the truth. We then consider a social planner whose objective consists of targeting the key player, i.e., the player who reduces the convergence time in the society. We show that the target agent has the lowest degree and the highest self weight in Katz-Bonacich centrality.

Biography

Akylai Taalibekova is a Doctoral Fellow in ExSIDE program. Currently, She is at the Center of Operation Research and Econometrics (CORE) at Université Catholique de Louvain. Her second university is Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. She works on the project Diffusion of Opinions and Innovations among Limitedly Forward-looking Individuals. She is interested in diffusion of information and opinion leaders in social networks.